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STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
BACKGROUND 
Riesland and Amestonia are neighboring States with a common 
language and similar ethnic composition. They enjoy healthy cross-border 
economic, cultural, and security ties. Riesland is the top importer of 
Amestonian agricultural products, which has contributed to Amestonia’s 
rapid GDP growth. The States have concluded a number of bilateral treaties 
on subjects such as tourism, extradition, and intelligence-sharing. 
 
THE BROADCASTING TREATY 
 One bilateral agreement between the States is the 1992 Treaty on the 
Establishment of Broadcasting Facilities (“the Broadcasting Treaty”). The 
Broadcasting Treaty entitles each state to furnish and operate a television 
station in the other’s territory. To accomplish this, the treaty provides certain 
protections from interference in the receiving State and extends privileges 
and immunities to the stations’ premises, property, and employees. Voice of 
Riesland (“VoR”), a division of Riesland’s state-owned and -operated 
broadcasting corporation, Riesland National Television (“RNT”), operates 
Riesland’s station in Amestonia. Since its inaugural program in 1992, VoR 
has broadcasted a variety of award-winning and highly acclaimed programs. 
 
THE FROST FILES 
In December 2014, Riesland national Frederico Frost, a former Riesland 
Secret Service Bureau (“the Bureau”)  intelligence analyst, gave a law firm 
in Amestonia a USB drive containing nearly 100,000 documents marked “top 
secret” (“the Frost Files”), which Frost claims were downloaded from Bureau 
computers. Frost also gave a copy of the USB to two reporters from The Ames 
Post, Amestonia’s most widely-circulated newspaper. In January and 
February 2015, The Ames Post gradually published thousands of these 
documents, unredacted, on its website. Riesland requested the documents’ 
return and Frost’s extradition under the States’ extradition treaty. Amestonia 
refused both requests. 
The Frost Files contained information indicating that beginning May 
2013, as part of a program called “Verismo,” the Bureau collected and stored 
telecommunications metadata from Amestonian citizens through a recording 
pod installed on an undersea fiber optic cable located in Riesland’s exclusive 
economic zone. The documents also discuss Riesland’s alleged operation of 
a program known as “Carmen.” This operation allegedly entailed the 
collection of data from the phones of Amestonian public and private leaders 
while those officials were guests on “Tea Time with Margaret.” 
Authorizations and safeguards for these intelligence operations were 
provided in the Secret Surveillance Bureau Act (“SSBA”).  
VOR ARRESTS AND SEIZURES 
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On 16 February 2015, the day The Ames Post published the Carmen 
documents, Amestonian police applied for and received a warrant to seize 
VoR’s assets and property, citing the documents as probable cause. Upon 
execution, the police seized the station’s property. At 3:15AM the following 
morning, Amestonian border patrol arrested three VoR employees, including 
Margaret Mayer, attempting to cross into Riesland by train. The three refused 
to produce travel documents upon request and were subsequently detained. 
Upon this development, the Amestonian police sought and obtained an arrest 
warrant for all three on suspicion of espionage. Amestonian investigators 
later determined that some confiscated VoR property was used for 
surveillance. The Amestonian Ministry of Justice obtained a forfeiture order 
against VoR’s real estate and property. Amestonia intends to sell the property 
at public auction, pending the resolution of this case. 
 
THE HIVE 
For several years, Rieslandic companies have supplied Amestonian 
farmers with insecticides known as neocontinoids, or “neonics,” which boost 
farmers’ yields. On 2 October 2012, the Institute for Land and Sustainable 
Agriculture (“ILSA”) published the results of a study identifying neonics’ 
negative effects on bees and other pollinators. ILSA called on Riesland and 
Amestonia to reevaluate the use of this insecticide. 
Sometime after 2 July 2013, an anonymous post appeared on 
www.longlivethehive.com. The post condemned politicians for failing to 
“respond to peaceful initiatives,” and called on the group to “command 
attention.” The post expressed a need to respond “effectively and in kind.” 
The website was primarily used by environmental activists to discuss ways 
to stop neonic use, including occasional calls for violent action, including 
sabotage and arson. 
On the night of 2 February 2014, seven Amestonian warehouses, which 
stored neonics, were simultaneously set on fire. The arson attacks killed 5 
people, including two Rieslandic nationals, and injured many others. The 
attacks caused €75 million of damage, and are expected to have long-term 
adverse health consequences for the local population. Police found spray-
painted images of a bee on the asphalt outside the warehouses. 
On 7 March 2014, 263 envelopes containing white powder and stamped 
with the image of a bee were sent to Ministries of Trade and Agriculture 
officials in Riesland and Amestonia, prominent Amestonian farmers, and 
board members of three Rieslandic neonic-producing corporations. That 
night, an anonymous online tweet warned that the “threat is real” and that 
“next time” the envelope recipients would “taste [their] own poison.” 
Following the attacks and subsequent threats, Riesland’s Prime Minister 
announced that she had ordered Riesland’s security and intelligence services 
to direct operations against the threat. 
On 16 October 2014, the Bureau Director informed the Amestonian 
Government that Bureau intelligence identified a plot to contaminate a large 
shipment of honey bound for Riesland with toxic neonicontinoids. The next 
day, Riesland issued a Terrorism Alert pursuant to the Terrorism Act 2003 
(“Terrorism Act”). On 21 October 2014 Amestonian police arrested three 
members of a group calling itself “The Hive” in possession of toxic neonics 
 




and detailed maps of Amestonian honey extraction facilities. Riesland 
reissued Terrorism Alerts in April 2015 and October 2015. 
 
JOSEPH KAFKER 
Riesland’s Attorney General announced that Rieslandic intelligence 
linked Joseph Kafker, a vocal opponent of neonics, to the highest echelons 
of the Hive. Documents show he was a “high level suspect” in the attempted 
poisoning of honey bound for Riesland. On 7 March 2015, Riesland detained 
Joseph Kafker in Riesland’s territory, announcing the Terrorism Act as the 
basis for his detention. Kafker’s detention was reviewed in a closed hearing 
on 10 March 2015 by the National Security Tribunal (“the Tribunal”), 
comprising five Rieslandic judges. The Tribunal granted the petition to 
detain Kafker for national security reasons and ruled that evidence against 
Kafker was “closed material” pursuant to the Terrorism Act. Kafker was 
represented at this proceeding by a Special Advocate but was not able to 
attend, communicate with his lawyer, or access the evidence presented. 
Kafker’s detention has been reviewed and extended by the Tribunal every 21 
days. Kafker was granted consular assistance, given access to his family, and 
allowed communication with the outside world throughout his detention. 
 
CYBER ATTACKS 
On 22 March 2015, malware similar to that used in the Carmen program 
and traceable to the computer infrastructures of the Rieslandic government 
was used to attack the networks and communication switches at Chester & 
Walsingham and The Ames Post. As a result of the attacks, the two targets 
suffered a combined €45-50 million in damages, The Ames Post shut down 
operations for two months, and a significant number of proceedings in 
Amestonian courts were delayed for months. 
 
APPLICATION TO THE COURT 
Amestonia and Riesland have agreed to refer this dispute to this Court 
by Special Agreement. Riesland, however, does not consent to the 
introduction of information derived from the Frost Files. The parties have 
stipulated in Article 2(b) of the Special Agreement that the issue of the 
admissibility of the documents is left for this Court to decide. 
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SUMMARY OF PLEADINGS 
FIRST PLEADING 
The illicitly-obtained documents published in The Ames Post 
(hereinafter “Frost Files”) are inadmissible before this Court. The Frost Files 
violate this Court’s standards of relevance and proof of authenticity. The 
documents do not derive from an independent body, result from personal and 
direct confirmation, or have multiple, impartial sources to verify their 
content. Because the documents are inadmissible, Amestonia cannot meet its 
burden to prove that Riesland’s intelligence programs violated international 
law. Even if this Court finds the documents to be admissible, they do not 
evidence any breach of an international obligation owed to Amestonia. 
Riesland’s intelligence programs did not violate its treaty obligations under 
the ICCPR because the programs were not under Riesland’s effective control, 
and in any event, did not constitute arbitrary interference into Amestonians’ 
right to privacy. Riesland’s intelligence programs also did not violate 
customary law because state practice and opinio juris support states’ right to 
engage in intelligence collection. 
 
SECOND PLEADING 
By entering Riesland’s broadcasting station without permission, 
ordering the forfeiture of its premises and property, and arresting and 
detaining the station’s employees, Amestonia violated Articles 1, 14, and 15 
of the Treaty on the Establishment of Broadcasting Facilities Between the 
State of Amestonia and the Federal Republic of Riesland (hereinafter 
“Broadcasting Treaty”). The treaty’s privileges and immunities remained in 
effect at the time of Amestonia’s breach because the station never ceased to 
function as envisaged by the Treaty, and in any event, any cessation of 
functions only impacted Article 15. Amestonia cannot declare the Treaty 
invalid under a fraud defense because Amestonia was not induced to 
conclude the treaty based on fraudulent conduct. Amestonia also cannot 
declare the Treaty suspended or terminated under a material breach defense 
because Riesland never acted to frustrate the Treaty’s object and purpose. In 
any event, Amestonia’s expropriation of Rieslandic property violated the 
customary norm of sovereign immunity because the station was a State 
instrumentality engaged in sovereign acts, and Riesland never explicitly 
waived its right to such immunity. As a result, Riesland is entitled to the 
release of its nationals and compensation for the value of its expropriated 
property, both of which are remedies within this Court’s power to order. 
 
THIRD PLEADING 
The detention of Joseph Kafker under the Terrorism Act  is consistent 
with international law. Riesland’s preventive detention of Kafker complied 
with its obligations under ICCPR Article 9. Kafker’s detention was not 
arbitrary and was reviewed by an independent and impartial tribunal, and 
Riesland provided sufficient notice of the reasons for Kafker’s arrest. Even 
 




if this Court finds that Kafker’s detention violated Article 9, Riesland 
lawfully derogated from the relevant Article 9 obligations. A state of 
emergency was justified under ICCPR Article 4 due to the actual and 
imminent threat to Riesland posed by Hive terrorists. Riesland’s derogation 
was necessary and proportional to the harm averted, concerned provisions 
that were lawfully derogable and followed proper procedure. ICCPR Article 
14, concerning criminal trials, does not apply to Kafker’s detention. This 
Court also has no authority to order Kafker’s release or disclosure of 
information about his detention, as the detaining state has the choice of means 
for compliance with this Court’s judgment, and in any event, the disclosure 
of confidential information poses a threat to national security.  
 
FOURTH PLEADING 
The cyber-attacks against the Ames Post and Chester & Walsingham 
computer systems cannot be attributed to Riesland. Circumstantial evidence 
of Riesland’s involvement in these operations cannot be linked to an organ 
of Riesland. Riesland also did not have effective control over the perpetrators 
and cannot be held liable for knowingly or negligently allowing the cyber-
attacks. In any event, the cyber-attacks do not constitute an internationally 
wrongful act. The cyber-attacks were not an unlawful use of force because 
they did not meet the threshold of physical damage, and in any event, the 
attacks constituted a legitimate exercise of Riesland’s right to self-defense. 
The cyber-attacks also did not violate the norm of non-intervention because 
they were not coercive. The cyber-attacks were also a valid countermeasure 
because Amestonia previously violated international law by allowing 
confidential data to be disseminated on its territory, and Riesland’s response 









I. THE ILLICITLY-OBTAINED DOCUMENTS PUBLISHED 
ON THE WEBSITE OF THE AMES POST ARE 
INADMISSIBLE BEFORE THE COURT, BUT IN THE 
EVENT THAT THE COURT DOES FIND THEM TO BE 
ADMISSIBLE, THEY DO NOT EVIDENCE ANY BREACH 
BY RIESLAND OF AN INTERNATIONAL OBLIGATION 
OWED TO AMESTONIA. 
A. The Frost Files are inadmissible. 
1. Irrelevant evidence is inadmissible before this 
Court.  
Only relevant evidence is admissible before this Court, and the “burden 
of evidence” lies upon the party seeking to prove a claim.1 The ICJ Statute 
requires relevance in requests for production of documents,2 and the Court’s 
Rules extend this requirement to evidentiary submissions.3 This Court, 
relying on practice from its Nicaragua4 and Tehran5 decisions, stated in 
Armed Activities that it would “examine the facts relevant to each of the 
component elements of the claims advanced by the Parties,” and “explain 
what items it should eliminate from further consideration.”6 The practice of 
requiring relevance is reflected in other international tribunals.7 
 
2. Documents are irrelevant if they cannot be 
                                                          
1 Robert Kolb, General Principles of Procedural Law in THE STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL 
COURT OF JUSTICE: A COMMENTARY 818 (Zimmermann et al., eds. 2006). 
2 Statute of the International Court of Justice, 59 STAT. 1055 (1945), [hereinafter “I.C.J. Statute”], 
Art.34. 
3 I.C.J. Rules of Court, I.C.J. Acts and Documents No. 6 (2007), Art.49(1)(memorials), 
Art.50(1)&(2)(pleadings), Art.63(1) (testimony), Art.71(translations), Art.76(provisional measures 
submissions). 
4 Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua/U.S.), Merits, 1986 
I.C.J. 14, ¶¶85-91.  
5 United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (U.S./Iran), Judgment, 1980 I.C.J. 3, ¶13. 
6 Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (D.R.C./Uganda), Judgment, 2005 I.C.J. 168, ¶59. 
7 Understanding on Rules and Procedures Regarding the Settlement of Disputes, WTO Analytical 
Index (2011), Art.XI(B)(3)(b)(ii)(599); Statute of the STL, Annex, U.N.Doc.S/RES/1757 (2007), 
Art.16(5); ICTY Rules of Procedure and Evidence, U.N.Doc.IT/32/Rev.50 (2015), Rule 89(C). 
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authenticated. 
International tribunals such as the Special Tribunal for Lebanon,8 
International Criminal Court,9 and International Criminal Tribunal for 
Yugoslavia10 note that a document's prima facie reliability is essential in 
determining whether the prerequisite of relevance is met. Regional11 and 
State12 courts have similarly found that documents with questionable 
authenticity lack the reliability required for admission. 
This Court’s recent Genocide decision specifically noted the importance 
of authenticity in determining relevance and admissibility.13 Although parties 
before the Court rarely question documents’ authenticity, in its determination 
of relevance, the Court looks at factors such as whether evidence stems from 
personal and direct confirmation,14 derives from official, independent 
bodies;15
 





contemporaneous and direct knowledge.18 The Court also examines the 
manner in which statements were made public19 and whether parties’ 
statements constitute acknowledgement of facts.20 This acknowledgement 
must be explicit when the subject matter is classified.21  
3. The Frost Files cannot be authenticated, and are 
                                                          
8 Ayyash et al., Decision on the Admissibility of Documents Published on the Wikileaks Website, 
STL-11-01, ¶40. 
9 Prosecutor/Katanga and Ngudjolo Chui, Judgment, ICC-01/04-01/07, ¶75. 
10 Prosecutor/Prlic et al., Interlocutory Appeal Decision, IT-04-74, ¶33. 
11 Prosecutor/Sary, Request Regarding Admission of Newly-Available U.S. Diplomatic Cables, 
[Extraordinary Chambers, Courts of Cambodia] 002/19-09-2007-ECCC-OCIJ, ¶¶7, 11 (2013). 
12 Am. Civil Liberties Union/Dep't of State, [U.S. District Court] 878 F. Supp. 2d 215, 221 (2012); 
Bancoult/Sec’y of State for Foreign &Commonwealth Affairs (No. 2), UKSC 2015/0021, ¶¶89, 93 (2015). 
13 Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide 
(Bosnia and Herzegovina/Serbia and Montenegro), Judgment, 2007 I.C.J. 43, ¶¶225-227. 
14 Corfu Channel Case (U.K./Alb.), Merits, 1949 I.C.J. 4, 16-17 (regarding witness testimony).  
15 Genocide Case, ¶227; Nicaragua, ¶¶65, 68. 
16 Genocide Case, ¶227.  
17 Case Concerning Oil Platforms (Iran/U.S.), Judgment, 2003 I.C.J. 161, ¶60; Armed Activities, 
¶61.  
18 Nicaragua, ¶¶62, 65. 
19 Nicaragua, ¶65. 
20 I.C.J. Rules of Court, Art 26(i).  
21 Nicaragua, ¶74.  
 




therefore irrelevant.  
The Frost Files do not derive from personal and direct confirmation 
from the purported author, from an official, independent body, or from 
multiple sources. Frost did not allege to have sent or received the original 
documents himself, and the source of each document was never disclosed.22 
No statements by Riesland could be interpreted as explicitly acknowledging 
the classified documents’ veracity. Although reporters and lawyers employed 
by The Ames Post reviewed these documents,23 they were not sufficiently 
impartial to review authentication, as the corporation employing them has a 
vested commercial interest in publishing the documents.24 State alleging a 
violation of international law has the burden to prove the existence and 
violation of that obligation;25 without the Frost Files, Amestonia lacks 
competent evidence to prove that Riesland’s intelligence programs violated 
international law.  
 
B. Even if the Court finds the documents to be admissible, 
they do not evidence any breach of an international 
obligation owed to Amestonia.26 
1. Riesland’s intelligence programs do not violate 
the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights (ICCPR).  
The ICCPR, to which Riesland and Amestonia are parties,27 protects 
individuals from “arbitrary or unlawful interference” with “privacy, family, 
home or correspondence.”28  
 
a. Surveillance did not occur in an area under 
                                                          
22 Clarifications, ¶3. 
23 Compromis, ¶22. 
24 William Worster, The Effect of Leaked Information on the Rules of International Law, 28 
AM.U.INT’L.L.R. 443, 445 (2013) (newspapers have a commercial interest in publishing documents). 
25 Corfu Channel, Dissenting Opinion of Judge Ečer,119-120, 129; GEORG SCHWARZENBERGER, 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 396 (1945); Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project (Hungary/Slovakia), 1997 I.C.J. 7, ¶79; 
See S.S. Lotus (Fr./Turk.), 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A), 18. 
26 Riesland’s discussion hereinafter of evidence originating from the Frost Files does not indicate 
acceptance of the documents’ authenticity.  
27 Compromis, ¶43. 
28 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966), 999 U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter 
“ICCPR”], Art.17(1). 
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Riesland’s effective control. 
The ICCPR requires states to respect and ensure the rights recognized 
in the Covenant “to all individuals within its territory and subject to its 
jurisdiction.”29 Although some argue for a strictly territorial application of 
the ICCPR,30 State practice indicates that the ICCPR applies, at most, only 
to areas under a state’s effective control.31 Scholars generally agree that the 
locus for determining effective control is the location of the interference 
itself.32 
Physical or legal control over a person or area is required to establish 
effective control. This Court has only found that ICCPR applied 
extraterritorially where a State’s security forces physically occupied the 
relevant territory for an extended period.33 Instances in which other courts 
have found extraterritorial application include the physical arrest of a 
person,34 confiscation of property at a consulate,35 and failure to provide 
state-owed pensions.36 The European Court of Human Rights similarly 
outlined three exhaustive examples of extraterritorial jurisdiction: the use of 
force by State agents, military action, and military occupation.37 
The statute authorizing Rieslandic intelligence permits only the 
collection of “foreign intelligence,” defined as “any information located or 
emanating from outside Riesland’s territory.”38 Applicant has provided no 
evidence that those surveilled under either program had any legal relationship 
with Riesland or that the programs physically injured any Amestonian 
citizens. Located in Riesland’s EEZ,39 the Verismo program’s interception of 
communications occurred outside of any State’s territory. Under UNCLOS 
                                                          
29 ICCPR, Art.2(1). 
30 Ashley Deeks, An International Legal Framework for Surveillance, 55 VA.  J.  INT’L L. 291, 307-
8 (2015) (discussing statements of Israel, Australia, Belgium, Germany, and the United Kingdom).  
31 Bankovic et al./17 NATO Member States, [ECtHR] No. 52207/99, ¶71 (2001); Issa v Turkey, 
[ECtHR] No. 31821/96, ¶58 (2004); Al-Skeini et al./U.K., [ECtHR] 53 EHRR 589, ¶¶133-137 (2011); 
Harold Koh, Memorandum Opinion on the Geographic Scope of the ICCPR, 4 (19 October 2010).  
32 Deeks, 300. 
33 Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, 
Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. 136, 110-111; Armed Activities, ¶59. 
34 Lopez Burgos/Uruguay, CCPR/C/13/D/52/1979, ¶¶12.2-12.3 (1981). 
35 Montero/Uruguay, CCPR/C/OP/2, 136 (1990). 
36 Gueye et al./France, U.N.Doc.CCPR/C/35/D/196/1985, ¶¶9.4-9.5 (1989). 
37 Al-Skeini, 27-32. 
38 Compromis, ¶4. 
39 Compromis, ¶22. 
 




Article 58, broadly considered custom,40 states may engage in intelligence 
collection in any EEZ without other States’ notice or consent.41 The Carmen 
program was located in Amestonia’s territory under Amestonian control. No 
use of force, military action, or military occupation occurred at the 
broadcasting station.42 Thus, the ICCPR cannot apply to these programs.  
 
b. In any event, Riesland’s actions did not violate 
the ICCPR. 
Courts frequently use a four-part test to determine whether surveillance 
programs violate the ICCPR: whether there was an interference with privacy 
or correspondence, whether the interference was in accordance with the law, 
whether the interference pursued a legitimate aim, and whether it was 
proportionate to that aim.43  
 
i. Verismo and Carmen did not 
arbitrarily interfere with privacy. 
Verismo only collected metadata of Amestonian citizens, filtering out 
irrelevant results.44 Carmen surveilled only high-level public and private 
officials.45 Monitoring electronic data of a large group of citizens is too 
broadly directed and superficial to constitute arbitrary interference,46 and 
targeted surveillance on high-level officials is too particularized to constitute 
arbitrary interference because it does not implicate average citizens.47  
ii. Any interference was in accordance 
                                                          
40 UNITED NATIONS DIVISION FOR OCEAN AFFAIRS AND THE LAW OF THE SEA, THE LAW OF THE 
SEA: PRACTICE OF STATES AT THE TIME OF ENTRY INTO FORCE OF UNCLOS 133 (UN Sales No.E.94.V.13, 
1994); NATALIE KLEIN, MARITIME SECURITY AND THE LAW OF THE SEA 45 (2011). 
41 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, 1833 U.N.T.S 3 (1982), Art.58(1); Raul 
Pedrozo, Responding to Ms. Zhang’s Talking Points on the EEZ, 10 CHINESE J. INT’L L. 207, 223 (2011) 
(noting activities of NATO, China, Japan, Australia, Russia, and South Africa). 
42 Broadcasting Treaty, Art.23(1). 
43 Marko Milanovic, Human Rights Treaties and Foreign Surveillance, 56 HARVARD INT’L L.R. 
81, 112 (2015); Gerhard Schmid, Special Rapporteur, Report on the Existence of a Global System for the 
Interception of Private and Commercial Communications (ECHELON Interception System) 
(2001/2098(INI), ¶7.2.1.  
44 Compromis, ¶¶22, 23. 
45 Compromis, ¶25. 
46 Milanovic, 120. 
47 Paul Stephan, The New International Law — Legitimacy, Accountability, Authority, and 
Freedom in the New Global Order, 70 U. COLO. L. REV. 1555, 1563 (1999); Milanovic, 319. 
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with law. 
The Human Rights Committee notes that interference must “take place 
on the basis of law, which itself must comply with the provisions, aims and 
objectives of the Covenant.”48 Any interference was in accordance with 
Rieslandic law, explicitly outlined in the SSBA.49 Structural safeguards, 
similar to those frequently used by States,50 limited Riesland’s surveillance,51 
including a “necessity” requirement, capacity for independent investigations, 
judicial review, issuance of limiting regulations, and a ban on surveillance 
implicating Rieslandic nationals. Riesland’s surveillance programs were 
regularly reviewed.52  
 
iii. Any interference pursued a legitimate 
aim. 
States regularly use surveillance both to advance their foreign policy 
interests53 and promote national security efforts.54 Rieslandic law limits 
intelligence collection to the pursuit of these aims.55 The Verismo program 
targeted potential threats to Riesland’s national security,56 and the Carmen 
program advanced Riesland’s foreign policy interests.57  
 
iv. Any interference was proportionate to 
its aim. 
Both programs abided by the SSBA limitations, which prevented them 
from exceeding the scope required by their objective. The Verismo program 
relied on specifically tailored search terms to track potential ecoterrorists58 
                                                          
48 HRC, General Comment No.16, U.N.Doc.HRI/GEN/1/Rev.1, ¶3 (1988). 
49 Compromis, ¶4. 
50 Canadian Security Intelligence Services Act, 2008 CF 301, ¶24. 
51 Compromis, ¶5. 
52 Compromis, ¶23; Clarifications, ¶5. 
53 See infra §I(B)(2). 
54 See infra §I(B)(2); The Right to Privacy in the Digital Age, U.N.Doc.A/RES/68/167 (2003), 
Preamble. 
55 Compromis, ¶4.  
56 Compromis, ¶25. 
57 Compromis, ¶26. 
58 Compromis, ¶22. 
 




and only stored information for a maximum of two years.59 The Carmen 
program only surveilled approximately 100 individuals, all of whom were 
high-ranking Amestonian leaders.60  
 
2. Riesland’s intelligence programs are consistent 
with customary international law. 
No customary restrictions on surveillance exist in international law,61 
based either on a right to territorial sovereignty or privacy.62 The widespread 
and long-standing practice of surveillance,63 the statements of States about 
surveillance,64 and arrangements between States to limit surveillance65 
support the permissiveness of surveillance. Many scholars interpret this 
widespread practice as an indication that states affirmatively recognize a 
right to engage in such conduct66 because spying is an integral part of a 
State’s right to protect itself.67 Neither specific type of intelligence program 
undertaken by Riesland is customarily prohibited; this includes tapping 
                                                          
59 Compromis, ¶23.  
60 Compromis, ¶¶25, 26. 
61 See Office of Gen. Counsel, U.S Dep’t of Def., An Assessment of International Legal Issues in 
Information Operations, 29 (May 1999); Daniel Silver, Intelligence and Counterintelligence in NATIONAL 
SECURITY LAW 965 (Moore et al., eds. 2005); W. Hays Parks, The International Law of Intelligence 
Collection in NATIONAL SECURITY LAW 433–434 (Moore et al., eds. 1990); Geoffrey Demarest, 
Espionage in International Law, 24 DENV. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 321, 321 (1996); Afsheen Radsan, The 
Unresolved Equation of Espionage and International Law, 28 MICH. J. INT’L L. 595, 596 (2007); Roger 
Scott, Territorially Intrusive Intelligence Collection and International Law, 46 A.F. L. REV. 217, 217 
(1999). 
62 Julius Stone, Legal Problems of Espionage in Conditions of Modern Conflict in ESSAYS ON 
ESPIONAGE AND INTERNATIONAL LAW, 36 (Stranger et al., eds. 1962); Simon Chesterman, The Spy Who 
Came in from the Cold War, 27 MICH. J. INT’L L. 1071, 1098 (2007); Weber & Saravia/Germany, 2006 
ECHR 1173, ¶81.  
63 Deeks, 305. 
64 Embassy Espionage: The NSA’s Secret Spy Hub in Berlin, DER SPIEGEL, (27 October 2013); 
Tony Abbott, Comments Before Australian Parliament, 18 Nov. 2013. 
65 See Paul Farrell, History of 5-Eyes, GUARDIAN (Dec. 2, 2013); W. Michael Reisman, Covert 
Action, 20 YALE J.INT’L.L. 419, 421 n.3 (1995). 
66 See, e.g. McDougal et al., The Intelligence Function and World Public Order, 46 TEMPLE L.Q. 
365, 394 (1973); See David Sanger, In Spy Uproar, ‘Everyone Does It’ Just Won’t Do, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 
25, 2013 (Modern examples of state spying). 
67 See Craig Forcese, Spies without Borders: International Law and Intelligence Collection, 5 J. 
NAT’L SECURITY L. & POL’Y, 179, 198–99 (2011); Christopher Baker, Tolerance of International 
Espionage, 19 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 1091, 1092 (2004).  
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communications of diplomats,68 which no State or diplomat has ever asserted 
was illegal,69 and mass telecommunications surveillance,70 a practice 
engaged in by many States.71  
 
II. THE ARREST OF MARGARET MAYER AND THE OTHER 
VOR EMPLOYEES, AND THE EXPROPRIATION OF THE 
VOR FACILITY AND ITS EQUIPMENT, VIOLATED THE 
BROADCASTING TREATY AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 
GENERALLY, AND RIESLAND IS THEREFORE 
ENTITLED TO THE IMMEDIATE RELEASE OF ITS 
NATIONALS AND COMPENSATION FOR THE VALUE OF 
THE CONFISCATED PROPERTY. 
A. The Broadcasting Treaty was in effect at the time of 
Amestonia’s breach. 
1. Riesland did not breach any VCLT provision 
justifying invocation of invalidity, suspension, 
or termination. 
a. The Broadcasting Treaty is not invalidated by 
fraud. 
 The VCLT, to which both States are parties,72 represents an 
exhaustive list of methods for invalidating, suspending, or terminating a 
treaty.73 Article 49 allows invalidation of a treaty if a State is “induced to 
give consent to a treaty which it would not otherwise have given” due to the 
other party’s fraudulent conduct.74 The term fraud includes “deceit or willful 
                                                          
68 Chesterman, 1086 (discussing U.S. and British intelligence services tapping communications of 
UNSC members). 
69 Id. 
70 Milanovic, 82; Chesterman, 1081. 
71 Deeks, 297. 
72 Compromis, ¶43. 
73 VCLT, Art.42 
74 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (1969), 1155 U.N.T.S. 331 [hereinafter “VCLT”], 
Art.49; Commentaries on the Draft Convention on the Law of Treaties, ILC Yearbook, [hereinafter 
“VCLT Commentaries”], (1966-II), 245. 
 




misrepresentation”75 “in the formation of an international agreement,”76 with 
the intention of “lead[ing] the other party into error.”77 A treaty between 
States has never been declared invalid due to fraud.78  
There is no evidence that fraudulent conduct was used in the formation 
of the Broadcasting Treaty. Unlike in the Timor-Leste arbitration, the only 
currently pending case involving a fraud accusation,79 Applicant has 
presented no evidence that espionage occurred during the Treaty negotiation; 
in fact, the Frost Files suggest otherwise; the execution of the Broadcasting 
Treaty predated the Carmen and Verismo programs by at least seven months, 
when the Broadcasting station first operated.80 Additionally, Applicant has 
presented no evidence that any statements made by Riesland in treaty 
negotiation “induced” Amestonia to conclude the Treaty. 
 
b. The treaty is not suspended or terminated due 
to material breach. 
The standard for material breach under VCLT Article 60 is objective, 
independent of the determination by the party invoking the claim.81  For a 
breach to be material, it must involve a provision essential to accomplishing 
the treaty’s object and purpose82 and must be deliberate and persistent.83 The 
object and purpose can be determined by looking at the treaty’s text and 
preamble.84  
Riesland did not violate a principle essential to the object and purpose 
                                                          
75 VIENNA CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF TREATIES: A COMMENTARY 839 (Dorr et al, eds. 2012).  
76 PAUL REUTER, INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF TREATIES 137-38 (1989); Donald Anton, The 
Timor Sea Treaty Arbitration: Timor-Lester Challenges Australian Espionage and Seizure of Documents, 
18 AM. SOC. INT’L L. BLOG 6 (26 February 2014).  
77 Contract Principles, International Institute for the Unification of Private Law Principles, Art 
3.2.5,cmt. 2 (2010).  
78 Anton, 6; ANTHONY AUST, MODERN TREATY LAW AND PRACTICE 254-55 (2000); Kate Mitchell 
et al., Espionage & Good Faith in Treaty Negotiations: East Timor v. Australia, J. EUR. L. BLOG (20 
January 2014). 
79 Anton, 6. 
80 Compromis, ¶8. 
81 SHABTAI ROSENNE, DEVELOPMENTS IN THE LAW OF TREATIES,1945–1986, 38 (1989); Tacna-
Arica Question (Chile/Peru), 2 R.I.A.A. 921, 945–944 (1922). 
82 VCLT Commentaries, 245; Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South 
Africa in Namibia (South West Africa), Advisory Opinion, 1971 I.C.J. 16, ¶95; Gabcikovo-Nagymaros, 
¶109. 
83 Namibia, ¶95. 
84 VCLT, Art.31(2). 
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of the Treaty. References to “friendship” and “cooperation” in the preamble 
illustrate that the object and purpose is to promote friendship through the 
broadcasting of television. The preamble directs the parties to “offer their 
citizens television channels,”85 the title refers only to the “establishment of 
broadcasting facilities,” and Articles I and II, outlining the stations’ 
functions, refer only to actions required for broadcasting. In Nicaragua, this 
Court noted, “There must be a distinction, even in the case of a treaty of 
friendship, between the broad category of unfriendly acts, and the narrower 
category of acts tending to defeat the object and purpose of a Treaty.”86 In 
that case, the Court found that certain unfriendly acts, such as cutting off 
economic aid, did not breach a “friendship” treaty between states which 
pertained to maritime commerce.87  
Riesland broadcasted award-winning programs for 22 years and 
continued to broadcast diverse content until Amestonia’s expropriation of 
property and arrest of VoR employees.88 Even if this Court finds that the 
intelligence program did not further friendship, such action, at the very least, 
does not harm friendship between States. States commonly use their property 
on foreign soil to conduct espionage,89 often with implicit acceptance of host 
states.90 Although spies have sometimes been declared persona non grata 
and expelled,91 in no instances has the operating treaty for a mission, 
consulate, or other special entity, which commonly contain “friendship” 
provisions,92 been resultantly declared invalid.93 Amestonia’s acceptance of 
intelligence from Riesland’s intelligence programs on over 50 occasions,94 
including intelligence on a terrorist plot to poison a large shipment of honey95 
supports the compatibility of Carmen and Verismo with the Broadcasting 
                                                          
85 Broadcasting Treaty, Preamble. 
86 Nicaragua, ¶137 
87 Nicaragua, ¶276.  
88 Compromis, ¶8. 
89 Jens Glüsing et al., Fresh Leak on US Spying: NSA Accessed Mexican President’s Email, DER 
SPIEGEL (20 October 2013) (describing spying from U.S. Embassies in Mexico City and Brasilia); George 
Roberts, Indonesia Summons Australian Ambassador to Jakarta Greg Moriarty over Spying Reports, 
AUSTRALIAN BROADCASTING CORP. (1 November 2013).  
90 Deeks, 312; Radsan, 621–622. 
91 Deeks, 312; Radsan, 621–622. 
92 See Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, 500 U.N.T.S. 95 (1964) Preamble; Vienna 
Convention on Consular Relations, 596 U.N.T.S. 261 (1967) Preamble; Convention on Special Missions 
(1985), 1400 U.N.T.S. 231, Preamble. 
93 Radsan, 622. 
94 Compromis, ¶23. 
95 Compromis, ¶18.  
 





B. Amestonia violated the Broadcasting Treaty. 
1. Broadcasting Treaty Article 36 does not 
invalidate Riesland’s privileges and immunities.   
Article 36 outlines the only method in which privileges and immunities 
can be suspended, stating: “All privileges and immunities provided for in this 
Treaty, save for those in Article 15(1)(c) above, shall cease to have effect 
upon the cessation of the station’s functions as envisaged in the Present 
Treaty.”96 Article 36 does not apply because the station in Amestonia never 
ceased to function as envisaged in the Treaty.97 Articles 1 and 2 outline the 
planned functions of the broadcasting stations, including the process for 
establishing stations, how they would be established and managed, and how 
programming would commence. The station continued to perform all of these 
functions until Amestonia’s violation.98 Riesland’s only potential violation 
involves “respecting the laws of the host state;” however, this Treaty 
provision specifically states that such violations are “without prejudice to 
their privileges and immunities.”99  
Even if privileges and immunities are invalidated under Article 36, this 
provision cannot nullify any Treaty provision other than Article 15. Under 
the treaty-interpretation principle of expressio unius, the specification of one 
issue implies the exclusion of all others.100 Since the Treaty included 
“immunities and privileges” language only in Article 15, the parties are 
presumed to have intended only Article 15 to be subject to termination under 
Article 36. Thus, even if the station ceases to function as envisaged, Riesland 
can claim relief for Applicant’s other Treaty violations. 
 
2. Amestonia’s arrest of VoR employees and 
seizure of VoR property violated the 
Broadcasting Treaty. 
A treaty is interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary 
meaning to be given to the terms in their context and in light of the treaty’s 
object and purpose.101 Interpretation begins by examining the treaty’s text, 
                                                          
96 Broadcasting Treaty, Art.36. 
97 See supra §II(A)(1)(b). 
98 See infra §II(B)(2). 
99 Broadcasting Treaty, Art.23. 
100 MARK VILLIGER, II CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW AND TREATIES 160 (1997). 
101 VCLT, Art.31(1-2). 
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both the body and preamble.102  
The text of the Broadcasting Treaty states that the station’s land is 
procured and held in the operating state’s name,103 that the station’s 
premises104 and documents105 are inviolable, and that agents of the host state 
cannot enter the station without consent.106 The station’s premises and 
property are immune from “search, requisition, attachment, expropriation, or 
execution.”107 Similarly, station employees are immune from arrest, 
attachment, and the receiving state’s criminal jurisdiction.108 The Treaty also 
imposes a “special duty” on the host state to protect the station from intrusion 
or damage, prevent impairment of the premises’ dignity,109 treat the station’s 
employees “with due respect,” and prevent attack on employees’ freedom or 
dignity.110  
Based on the ordinary meaning given to these terms, Amestonia 
breached each of these provisions. Amestonia entered the broadcasting 
station without permission, catalogued and removed equipment and 
documents,111 arrested and detained employees for criminal charges,112 
ordered forfeiture of the premises and property,113 and attempted to auction 
off the station’s real estate and property.114  
 
C. The expropriation of VoR property violated Riesland’s 
sovereign immunity. 
1. State entities are entitled to a presumption of 
                                                          
102 VCLT, Art.31(2-3). 
103 Broadcasting Treaty, Art.1(2). 
104 Broadcasting Treaty, Art.14(1). 
105 Broadcasting Treaty, Art.14(4). 
106 Broadcasting Treaty, Art.14(1). 
107 Broadcasting Treaty, Art.14(2). 
108 Broadcasting Treaty, Art.15(1)(b). 
109 Broadcasting Treaty, Art.14(3). 
110 Broadcasting Treaty, Art.15(1)(a). 
111 Compromis, ¶27. 
112 Compromis, ¶28. 
113 Compromis, ¶40. 
114 Compromis, ¶40. 
 





The universally recognized principle of foreign sovereign immunity115 
creates a presumption of immunity for both States and state 
instrumentalities.116 Unless Amestonia can demonstrate the applicability of 
an exemption,117 its exercise of jurisdiction through enforcement against a 
Rieslandic instrumentality violates Riesland’s sovereign rights.118 
 
2. The Voice of Riesland is a state instrumentality. 
To determine whether an entity is a state instrumentality, courts 
consider whether the entity is indistinct or distinct from the State,119 or 
“performing acts in the exercise of sovereign authority of the State.”120 
Courts examine factors such as ownership and control of the entity; 
appointment and dismissal of administrative personnel; degree and nature of 
government control; constitution of the entity; and relationship between the 
entity and government.121  
VoR is a division of RNT, a state-owned and -operated corporation.122 
VoR was created specifically by a treaty between States designed to promote 
friendship through public broadcasting.123 The Rieslandic government was 
responsible for “staffing, running, and funding the station,” “procur[ing] at 
its own expense and in its own name” the station’s equipment, and 
                                                          
115 IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 326 (2003); ANTONIO CASSESE, 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 100 (2005); MALCOLM SHAW, INTERNATIONAL LAW 697, 701 (2008). 
116 See United Nations Convention on Jurisdictional Immunities of States and Their Property 
(2005), 44 I.L.M. 801, [hereinafter “Immunities Convention”], Arts. 10–11, 13–17; European Convention 
on State Immunity (1972), C.E.T.S. No. 074, Arts. 4–12; Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (1985), 
[Austl.] No. 196, §§11–12, 14–20; Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, [U.S.] 28 U.S.C. 1602–
1611, Art.1605(a)(2)–(4), (6); State Immunities Act, [Can.] R.S.C., 1985, c. S-18, §§5, 7–8; State 
Immunities Act, [U.K] 1978 c. 33, pt. I, §§2–4, 6–11. 
117 Nicaragua, ¶101. 
118 See BROWNLIE, 323, 325-26; CASSESE, 100, 102; SHAW, 697, 701; Prosecutor/Blaskic, 
Judgment of 18 July 1997, [ICTY] IT-95-14, ¶72 (1997). 
119 XIAODONG YANG, STATE IMMUNITY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 297 (2015) (citing cases in 
England, Singapore, Germany, France, South Africa, and the U.S). 
120 Immunities Convention, Art.2(1)(b)(iii).  
121 Yang, 297. 
122 Compromis, ¶8.   
123 See supra §II(A)(1)(b). 
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“establishing and operating” the station.124 The government, through the 
Bureau, also provided direct oversight over VoR’s intelligence activities and 
served as a conduit for interpreting the station’s intelligence.  
3. The commercial activity exemption does not 
apply. 
Only a state instrumentality’s commercial acts are subject to foreign 
jurisdiction; all other acts are immune.125  To determine whether an act is 
commercial, both its nature and purpose are considered.126 In Jurisdictional 
Immunities, this Court ruled that the commercial activities exemption did not 
apply to property serving as an Italian-German cultural exchange center127 
because it was “intended to promote cultural exchanges,” was “organized and 
administered on the basis of an agreement between the two Governments,” 
and involved State oversight in its “managing structure.”128As in 
Jurisdictional Immunities, the broadcasting station intended to promote 
cultural exchanges, was organized and administered under an agreement 
between States, and was managed by Riesland government agents. 
Additionally, the facility engaged in public broadcasting, which, by its 
definition, serves to broadcast content without making a profit. Riesland’s 
intelligence activities also did not intend to procure any commercial value 
from Amestonian citizens, and the information collected was not used for 
any commercial benefit to Riesland.  
 
4. Riesland did not waive immunity. 
Although States may waive immunity,129 States’ intention to waive must 
be clearly expressed and specific to the litigation at issue.130  Riesland never 
explicitly or implicitly waived its right to privileges and immunities for the 
VoR premises or property, and the only privileges and immunities mentioned 
in the Broadcasting Treaty concern employees. 
 
D. Riesland is entitled to the immediate release of its 
nationals and compensation for the value of the 
confiscated property. 
1. Riesland is entitled to immediate release of its 
                                                          
124 Broadcasting Treaty, Arts. 1, 2. 
125 CASSESE, 100; SHAW, 708. 
126 Immunities Convention, Art.2(2); CASSESE, 101. 
127 Jurisdictional Immunities of the State (Germany/Italy), Judgment, 2012 I.C.J. 99, ¶120. 
128 Jurisdictional Immunities, ¶119. 
129 Yang, 316. 
130 Immunities Convention, Art.7. 
 





In circumstances where ceasing the wrongful act and restoring it to its 
prior situation is possible, this Court131 and its predecessor132 have recognized 
restitution as a remedy in international law; reparations should “re-establish 
the situation which would, in all probability, have existed if that act had not 
been committed.”133 Although the remedy for wrongful deprivations of 
liberty is typically “review and reconsideration,”134 immediate release of 
nationals is the proper remedy when State immunity is violated, either by 
treaty or custom.135 
 
2. Riesland is entitled to compensation for the 
value of its property. 
A State may not expropriate foreign-owned property without providing 
full compensation.136 Opinio juris evidenced in General Assembly 
Resolution 1803137 illustrates this standard, and modern courts reaffirm it.138 
When Amestonia expropriated VoR property, Riesland became entitled to 
full compensation for such property.  
III. THE DETENTION OF JOSEPH KAFKER UNDER THE 
TERRORISM ACT IS CONSISTENT WITH 
INTERNATIONAL LAW, AND THE COURT HAS NO 
AUTHORITY TO ORDER KAFKER’S RELEASE OR 
DISCLOSURE OF INFORMATION RELATED TO HIS 
DETENTION. 
A. Riesland’s preventive detention of Joseph Kafker 
                                                          
131 Nicaragua, p.145 ¶12; Tehran, p.45, ¶5.  
132 Mavromatis Jerusalem Concessions, 1925 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) 5, 51; Factory at Chorzów 
(Ger./Pol.), 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) 9, 541. 
133 Chorzow Factory, 541. 
134 See infra §III(D). 
135 See Tehran, ¶¶84-87, 91-92. 
136 Chorzow Factory, 30; BROWNLIE, 54; BIN CHENG, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF LAW AS APPLIED 
TO INTERNATIONAL COURTS AND TRIBUNALS 39 (1953); SAMMY FRIEDMAN, EXPROPRIATION IN 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 204 (1953). 
137 Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources, U.N.Doc.A/Res/1803, ¶4 (2008).  
138 Christina Binder et al., Unjust Enrichment in MAX PLANCK ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 4 (2007); Patrick Norton, A Law of the Future of the Future or of the Past? Modern 
Tribunals and the International Law of Expropriation, 85 AM. J. INT’L L. 474, 476-477 (1991). 
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complied with the ICCPR and customary law. 
ICCPR Article 9 protects individuals from arbitrary detention.139 States 
can lawfully detain individuals preventively, without criminal charges, in a 
manner fully consistent with the ICCPR.140 The practice of ICCPR Parties, 
which this Court must consider,141 confirms this interpretation.142 Though 
ICCPR substantive protections from deprivation of liberty are coextensive 
with customary law, ICCPR procedural protections are stricter than 
custom.143   
 
1. Kafker’s detention was not arbitrary. 
a. Kafker’s detention accorded with procedures 
established by law. 
Preventive detention is arbitrary when it is not conducted according to 
clear procedures established by domestic law.144 Specific authorization and 
circumscribed procedure are required safeguards against arbitrariness.145 
Kafker was detained pursuant to the Terrorism Act, which allows detention 
only when it is “required for reasons of national security or public safety,”146 
and his detention was reviewed by the NST.147  
 
b. Kafker’s preventive detention was necessary 
                                                          
139 ICCPR, Art.9(1). 
140 Louis Joinet, Special Rapporteur, Report on the Practice of Administrative Detention, 
U.N.Doc.E/CN.4/Sub.2/1990, [hereinafter “Joinet Report”], 29 (1990); CLAIRE MACKEN, COUNTER-
TERRORISM AND THE DETENTION OF SUSPECTED TERRORISTS 95 (2011); Schweizer/Uruguay, 
CCPR/C/17/D/66/1980, ¶18.1 (1980); See HRC, General Comment No.29, 
U.N.Doc.CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.11, ¶15 (2001). 
141 VCLT Art.31(3)(b). 
142 PREVENTIVE DETENTION AND SECURITY LAW: A COMPARATIVE SURVEY (Harding et al., eds. 
1993) (examining preventive detention in 17 African, Asian, and European States); S.B. Elias, Rethinking 
“Preventive Detention” from a Comparative Perspective, 41 COL. H.R.L.R. 130 (2009)(citing preventive 
detention frameworks in 11 European and South American States). 
143 Report of the Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, U.N.Doc.A/HRC/22/44, [hereinafter 
“Working Group Report”], ¶¶42-51 (2012); Joinet Report, 7. 
144 HRC, General Comment No.35, U.N.Doc.CCPR/C/GC/35, ¶¶22, 23 (2014); ICCPR, Art.9. 
145 See SARAH JOSEPH ET AL., THE INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS: 
CASES, MATERIALS, AND COMMENTARY, 211 (2000). 
146Terrorism Act, §3(d). 
147 Compromis, ¶33. 
 




and proportional to the threat he posed. 
Preventive detention must be necessary and proportional to the threat 
posed by the individual,148 such that the deprivation of liberty is not 
inappropriate, unpredictable, or substantively unjust.149 Courts require that 
detention be reasonable under the circumstances150 and that no alternative 
means could accomplish the objective.151 International152 and national153 
courts grant significant deference to State authorities’ judgments on the 
necessity and proportionality of detentions for security reasons. 
 
i. Kafker’s detention was reasonable 
because he posed an imminent and 
severe threat. 
Preventive detention is an exceptional step,154 reasonable when the 
detainee poses an imminent and severe threat to State security.155 Such a 
threat exists when reasonable grounds156 indicate that an individual will assist 
in preparation or planning for a terrorist act.157 Rieslandic intelligence linked 
                                                          
148 Arbitrary Detention, U.N.Doc.A/HRC/Res/6/4, ¶5(e) (2007); HRC, General Comment No.31, 
U.N.Doc.CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.13, ¶6 (2004); A./Australia, CCPR/C/59/D/560/1993, ¶9.2 (1997); 
C./Australia, CCPR/C/76/D/900/1999, ¶14 (2002); See, e.g. Criminal Code Act 1995, [Austl.] No. 1995, 
§105.4(5)(b-c). 
149 Van Alphen/Netherlands, U.N.Doc.CCPR/C/39/D/305/1988, ¶5.8 (1989); Report of the Third 
Committee on the ICCPR, U.N.Doc.A/4045, Annexes Agenda Item 32, ¶7 (1958) 
150 Shafiq/Australia, CCPR/C/88/D/1324/2004, ¶4.10 (2004); Morais/Angola, 
CCPR/C/83/D/1128/2002, ¶6.1, (2005). 
151 D. & E./Australia, U.N.Doc.CCPR/C/87/D/1050/2002, ¶ 7.2 (2006); MACKEN, 50; Principles 
and Best Practices on the Protections of Persons Deprived of Liberty in the Americas, OAS 
OEA/Ser/L/V/II 131 Doc.26, [hereinafter “IACHR Detention Principles”], Prin. III.2 (2008). 
152 See Y. ARAI-TAKAHASHI, THE MARGIN OF APPRECIATION DOCTRINE AND THE PRINCIPLE OF 
PROPORTIONALITY IN THE JURISPRUDENCE OF THE ECHR, 180(2002); Greece/U.K. (Cyprus Case), 2 
Y.B.E.C.H.R. (1959-1960), 176. 
153 Elias, 130 (referring to 13 State courts). 
154 Mukong/Cameroon, CCPR/C/45/D/458/1991, ¶9.8 (1991);  
155 General Comment No.35, ¶15; Schweizer/Uruguay, ¶114; Report on Terrorism and Human 
Rights, [Inter-Am. Commission on Human Rights], OAS OEA/Ser.L/V/VII 116 Doc. 5, rev. 1, corr. 22, 
[hereinafter “Terrorism Report”], ¶124 (2002). 
156 Venice Commission Report on Counter-Terrorism Measures and Human Rights, CDL-
AD(2010)022, §D(50) (2010); See, e.g. Anti-Terrorism Act of 2001, [Can.] Bill-36, §86.3. 
157 See, e.g. Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth) Sub-S 105.4 (Australia); See also Martin Scheinin, 
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Kafker to the “senior echelons” of a terrorist group that had killed Rieslandic 
citizens and threatened Reislandic officials.158 Furthermore, Kafker was a 
“high-level” suspect in the plot to poison a large shipment of honey.159 These 
ties justified his detention. 
 
ii. No alternative means existed to 
mitigate the threat Kafker posed. 
The HRC has observed that detention is necessary when a subject may 
flee160 or could thwart an ongoing investigation.161 Detention was the only 
means to monitor Kafker, eliminate his ability to coordinate with the Hive, 
and prevent him from absconding to assist in an act of terrorism. 
 
c. The length of Kafker’s detention was not 
arbitrary. 
The HRC has found a detention lasting 14 months not to violate Article 
9(4),162 and has only found violations where detentions persisted for several 
years without trial.163 By comparison, Riesland has only detained Kafker for 
10 months, and the maximum allowed by the Terrorism Act is only 540 
days.164 
2. The National Security Tribunal satisfies 
Kafker’s right to judicial review. 
a. The NST is independent and impartial. 
Prompt review of a detention by an independent tribunal–which enjoys 
judicial independence from other branches to decide legal matters in 
proceedings that are judicial in nature165–is necessary in all circumstances to 
                                                          
Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms While Countering Terrorism, UN.Doc.A/HRC/14/46 (2010), ¶42. 
158 Compromis, ¶16,18. 
159 Compromis, ¶36; See supra n.26. 
160 A./Australia, CCPR/C/59/D/560/1993, ¶9.5 (1997). 
161 Jalloh/Netherlands, CCPR/C/74/D/794/1998, ¶8.2 (2002) 
162 Thomas/Jamaica, CCPR/C/65/D/614/1995, ¶9.6 (1999). 
163 See Press Release, 26-01-2012, ECHR 032 (2012): Berasategi/France (29095/09), Esparza 
Luri/France (29119/09), Guimon Esparza/France (29116/09), Sagarzazu/France (29109/09), Soria 
Valderrama/France, 29101/09; See also Report of the Third Committee on the ICCPR, A/4045, 13 
GAOR, Annexes, Agenda Item 32, 7 (1958-1959). 
164 Terrorism Act, §3(h). 
165 Vuolanne/Finland, 265/1987, U.N.Doc.Supp.No.40 A/44/40, ¶9.6 (1989); UN Basic Principles 
 




satisfy Article 9(4).166 Valid national security concerns justify holding a 
review hearing without the detainee present,167 as in Kafker’s case. The NST 
is independent from the executive and comprised of judges. Specialized 
courts created by legislation, like the NST, satisfy Article 9 if they meet the 
Article’s other criteria.168 
 
b. Kafker’s detention was promptly reviewed. 
The HRC and the Working Group on Arbitrary Detention state that 
prompt review of a detention must occur within “a few days.”169 The 
Terrorism Act requires review within three days of arrest,170 and Kafker’s 
detention complied.171  
 
c. Kafker’s detention was adequately reviewed. 
The essential components of review are: (1) that the reviewing court 
have the power to order release if the detention is unlawful,172 and (2) that it 
re-review regularly.173 The NST has the power to order release if evidence is 
insufficient to support detention and reviews detention every 21 days.174 
 
d. Kafker’s representation by a Special Advocate 
satisfies Article 9. 
Article 9 does not expressly confer a right to counsel outside of criminal 
                                                          
on the Independence of the Judiciary, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.121/22/Rev.1, Prin. 2(1985); Torres/Finland¸ 
CCPR/C/38/D/291/1988, ¶7.2(1990). 
166 HRC Gen. Comm. 35, ¶¶39-41,46; Gavrilin/Belarus, CCPR/C/D/1342/2005¶7.4(2007); 
Mulezi/DRC, CCPR/C/81/D/962/2001, ¶5.2(2004); Fjalkowska/Poland, CCPR/C/84/D/1061/2002, 
¶8.4(2005). 
167 See Ahani/Canada, UN.Doc.CCPR/C/1051/2002, ¶2.3 (2002). 
168 HRC Gen Comm. 35, ¶¶18-22; Rameka/New Zealand, CCPR/C/79/D/1090/2002, ¶7.4 (2003); 
Torres/Finland, ¶7.2, 9.6. 
169 HRC Gen. Comm 35, ¶33; Working Group Report, ¶52; See Freemantle/Jamaica, 
CCPR/C/68/D/625/1995 ¶7.4 (2000). 
170 Terrorism Act §3(b). 
171 Compromis, ¶. 
172 ICCPR Art.9(4); See Cases of De Wilde, Ooms & Versyp/Belgium (2832/66) 1970 ECHR 2, ¶76 
(1970); A./Australia, ¶9.5; Shafiq/Australia, ¶7.4 (2004). 
173 HRC Gen. Comm. 35, ¶15. 
174 Terrorism Act, §3(d),(g); Compromis, ¶33. 
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trials.175 ICCPR States Parties interpret Article 9 to allow suspension of 
access to counsel if “it is deemed indispensable…to maintain security and 
good order.”176 Though the HRC recognizes an absolute right to counsel,177 
the aforementioned interpretation of the parties and international tribunals 
contradict this view.178 
 
3. Kafker was sufficiently notified of the reasons of 
his arrest. 
Article 9(1) requires a State to promptly notify the detainee of the 
reasons for his arrest.179 Oral notification satisfies this requirement180 if it is 
precise enough to allow the grounds for detention to be challenged.181 The 
Terrorism Act, stated as the authorization for Kafker’s arrest, includes a 
specific definition of the suspected conduct, accompanied by relevant factors 
for consideration.182 The purpose of Article 9’s notification requirement was 
satisfied by Kafker’s Special Advocate, who did have access to the “closed 
materials” forming the basis of his detention and challenged detention on 
Kafker’s behalf.183 
 
B. If Kafker’s detention did violate Article 9, Riesland 
lawfully derogated from the relevant obligations. 
1. The Hive posed a threat to the life and health of 
the nation, justifying derogation during a state 
                                                          
175 ICCPR, Art.9. 
176 Body of Principles for the Protection of All Persons Under any Form of Detention or 
Imprisonment, GA Res. 43/173 (1988), Prin.18(3); See Bin Nasir/Kerajean Malaysia & Others, 2002-4 
M.L.J. 617 [Malaysia][2002]; Report of the Committee Against Torture, 
G.A.O.R.Supp.No.44(A/67/44)(2012), 63-64,¶8(Morocco). 
177 HRC Gen. Comm. 35, ¶15 
178 See, e.g., Exceptions to the Exhaustion of Domestic Remedies, Advisory Opinion, 1990 IACtHR 
(Ser. A) No. 11, ¶28 (1990); Ocalan/Turkey (No. 2), ECtHR Nos. 24069/03, 197/04, 6201/06, and 
10464/07 (2014). 
179 ICCPR, Art.9(1); See HRC Gen. Comm. 35, ¶25-30. 
180 HRC Gen. Comm. 35, ¶¶24-27 
181 Caldas/Uruguay, UN.Doc.CCPR/C/19/D/43/1979, ¶13.2(1983); Campbell/Jamaica, 
UN.Doc.CCPR/C/47/D/307/1988, ¶6.3(1993); NOWAK, UN COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS 
174(2005) 
182 Terrorism Act, §3(a),(d). 
183 Compromis, ¶33. 
 





International courts grant a measure of discretion to State authorities in 
declaring states of emergency and determining how to respond.184 Threats to 
state security from terrorism can be legitimate grounds for derogation,185 
provided the threat is imminent186 and affects the “organized life of the State” 
as a whole.187  
Threats must be more concrete than “general terrorist activity” in a 
region,188 which could otherwise be used to justify derogation in 
perpetuity.189 Riesland derogated during a Terrorism Alert, which could only 
be issued when the government of Riesland learned of a “credible danger of 
an imminent terrorist act.”190  
Threats must pertain to the entire populace.191 The Hive had already 
killed two Rieslandic citizens and attempted to poison a large shipment of a 
Riesland household good.192 Threats which harm the functioning of public 
institutions, in particular, are threats to “organized life.”193 The Hive 
threatened mass harm to Rieslandic government officials through mailing 
letters filled with imitation poison.194 
 
2. Riesland derogated only to the extent strictly 
                                                          
184 J.F. Hartman, Derogation from Human Rights Treaties in Public Emergencies, 22 HARVARD 
INT’L L. J. 25, 27 (1981); See Lawless/Ireland, [ECtHR] No. 332/57 (A/3), 15,28 (1961); Klass & 
Others/Germany, 2 E.H.R.R. 214, ¶¶48-49(1979); Ireland/U.K., (5310/71)ECHR 1, ¶207 (1978); See also 
ROZA PATI, DUE PROCESS AND INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM 20, n.69 (2009). 
185 Case of Durand and Ugarte, I.A.Ct.H.R. Series C, No. 68, ¶99 (2000); Brannigan & 
McBride/United Kingdom,  ECHR Series A No. 258-B, ¶59(1993); IACHR Terrorism Report, Executive 
Summary, ¶8. 
186 See A. SVENSSON-MCCARTHY, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF HUMAN RIGHTS AND STATES OF 
EXCEPTION WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE IN THE TRAVAUX PREPARATOIRES AND CASE-LAW OF THE 
INTERNATIONAL MONITORING ORGANS 292 (1992). 
187 The Greek Case, 3321/67, 3322/67; 3323/67, 3344/67 [E.Comm.H.R.] ¶ 153 (1969); 
Lawless/Ireland¸ ¶28; See HRC Gen Comm 29, ¶4. 
188 Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights, Opinion 1/2002 (Comm. DH (2002) 7, 28 
August 2002), ¶33. 
189 JAIME ORAA, HUMAN RIGHTS IN STATES OF EMERGENCY 22 (1992); MACKEN 84. 
190 Terrorism Act, §2. 
191 Lawless/Ireland, ¶90; ORAA 29; See Askoy/Turkey, E.C.H.R. 21987/93, ¶70(1996). 
192 Compromis, ¶14,18. 
193 Lawless/Ireland, ¶29: SVENSSON-MCCARTHY, 294; Hartman, 16. 
194 Compromis, ¶16. 
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required by the exigencies of the situation. 
Derogations must be limited “to the extent strictly required by the 
exigencies of the situation.”195 The existence of a state of emergency is also 
considered in the necessity analysis for individual detainees.196 Following ex 
ante procedures is the chief safeguard against disproportionality.197 Riesland 
has adhered to the Terrorism Act during Kafker’s detention and periodically 
reviewed that detention.198 
 
3. Riesland followed sufficient procedure for 
derogation. 
States wishing to derogate must announce that intention by declaring a 
state of emergency.199 Riesland has notified the Secretary-General of each 
Terrorism Alert, 200 which effectively declares a state of emergency in 
Riesland. This notification comports with the practice of States Parties,201 
despite the HRC’s stricter interpretation.202 In any event, failure to follow 
proper notification does not preclude derogations from taking effect.203 
 
4. The relevant provisions are lawfully derogable. 
The provisions of Article 9 are not listed as non-derogable in the 
ICCPR204 and thus almost all can be lawfully derogated from during public 
emergencies.205 The right to prompt judicial review, which is non-derogable 
                                                          
195 ICCPR Art.4(1); HRC Gen Comm 29, ¶4; Working Group Report, ¶50-51; See A/Secretary of 
State for the Home Dep’t, [2004] UKHL 56, ¶¶39, 46.  
196 HRC Gen. Comm. 35, ¶66. 
197 See Concluding Observations: Phillipines (CCPR/CO.PHL.2003), ¶14, Mauritius 
(CCPR/CO/83/MUS, 2005), ¶12, Russian Federation (CCPR/C/RUS/CO/6.2009), ¶24, Honduras 
(CCPR/C/HND/CO/1/2006), ¶13. 
198 Compromis, ¶33; See Campbell/Jamaica, ¶6.4. 
199 Wall Opinion, ¶127. 
200 Clarifications, ¶7. 
201 JOAN FITZPATRICK, HUMAN RIGHTS IN CRISIS 3-5(1994); See, e.g. Concluding Observations: 
Peru, CCPR/C/79/Add.8, ¶10(1992); Ireland, CCPR/C/79/Add.21, ¶11(1993); Cameroon, 
CCPR/C/79/Add.33, ¶7(1994). 
202 Gen. Comm. 29, ¶17. 
203Nabil Sayadi & Patricia Vinck v. Belgium, CCPR/C/78/933/2000, Concurring Op., Nigel Rodley 
(2008); SVENSSON-MCCARTHY, 226. 
204 ICCPR, Art.4(2). 
205 MACKEN 90. 
 




under any circumstances,206 was granted to Kafker.207  
 
C. Article 14 does not apply to Kafker’s detention. 
Article 14 expressly refers to criminal proceedings.208 Preventive 
detentions are not carried out in order to pursue criminal sanctions on the 
basis of guilt,209 but rather are precautionary measures to mitigate a threat to 
society.210 The HRC generally does not apply Article 14 to detentions that 
are not preceding criminal charge.211 Scholars suggest indefinite detention 
without criminal trial can violate Article 14,212 but Kafker’s detention is 
limited to 540 days by law.213  
D. If Kafker’s detention is unlawful, Amestonia’s remedy 
is “review and reconsideration,” not release. 
This Court has stated that the choice of the specific method of 
compliance with its judgments is for parties before the court, not the court 
itself.214 Outside the context of a violation of State immunity,215 the Court 
has noted that the proper remedy for wrongful detention is “review and 
reconsideration” of the action, and that the choice of means should be left to 
the detaining state.216 In Avena, the Court reaffirmed the appropriateness of 
                                                          
206 HRC Gen. Comm. 29, ¶¶16,31; Concluding Observations: Israel, CCPR/C/79/Add.93, 
¶21(1998).  
207 See supra §3(A)(2). 
208 ICCPR, Art.14. 
209 H. Cook, Preventive Detention – International Standards on Protection of the Individual, in 
PREVENTIVE DETENTION: A COMPARATIVE AND INTERNATIONAL LAW Perspective 1 (Frankowski & 
Shelton, eds. 1992); See also International Committee of Jurists, States of Emergency: Their Impact on 
Human Rights (Geneva 1983), 394. 
210 R/Halliday (1917) AC 216 [Canada]; International Committee of Jurists, 394; Union of 
India/Paul Nanicakn & Anr, Appeal(Crl)[India] 21 of 2002(2003). 
211 Ahani/Canada, ¶¶4.15, 4.16. 
212 See Alfred de Zayas, Human Rights and Indefinite Detention, 87 INT’L R. RED CROSS 15, 19 
(2005); See also Perterer/Austria, CCPR/C/81/D/1015/2001, ¶9.2(2004). 
213 Terrorism Act, §3(h). 
214 Haya de la Torre Case,  1951 I.C.J. REP. 71,  p.79; Northern Cameroons Case, Preliminary 
Objections, 1963 I.C.J. REP. 15, p.37. 
215 See Tehran, ¶84-87, 91-92; See also supra §I(D)(1). 
216 LaGrand, 2000 ICJ Rep. 4, ¶125. 
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allowing the detaining state to choose the means of compliance.217 Thus, the 
appropriate remedy for a violation of Article 9 would be for Riesland to 
review and reconsider Kafker’s detention, considering what response would 
adequately address the violation of rights alleged.218  
 
E. The Court cannot compel Riesland to disclose the 
confidential information forming the basis of Kafker’s 
arrest. 
The Court does not have authority to compel States to disclose 
confidential information threatening national security.219 Such disclosure 
risks irreparable injury to States.220 Furthermore, though the Court can 
request evidence from parties in evidentiary proceedings,221 it cannot compel 
that production, given that “the parties are sovereign states.”222 This 
limitation also applies to remedial production of documents implicating State 
security.223 The evidence for Kafker’s arrest was “closed material” from 
confidential sources in the intelligence community,224 which justifies 
maintaining its confidentiality. 
IV. THE CYBER-ATTACKS AGAINST THE COMPUTER 
SYSTEMS OF THE AMES POST AND THE LAW FIRM 
CANNOT BE ATTRIBUTED TO RIESLAND, AND, IN ANY 
EVENT, THE CYBER-ATTACKS DO NOT CONSTITUTE 
AN INTERNATIONALLY WRONGFUL ACT. 
A. Circumstantial evidence of Rieslandic involvement in 
the cyber-activities must meet a heightened burden of 
proof. 
This court’s jurisprudence has consistently reflected a heightened 
degree of proof for claims based primarily on circumstantial evidence 
                                                          
217 Case Concerning Avena & Other Mexican Nationals, 2004 I.C.J. 12, ¶120, ¶127-132. 
218 See Avena ¶¶138-143; LaGrand, ¶128. 
219 See Genocide Case ¶¶44, 205-206., Corfu Channel, p. 32. 
220 See Questions Relating to the Seizure and Detention of Certain Documents and Data (Timor-
Leste/Australia), Provisional Measures, 2014 I.C.J. 147, ¶¶46-49. 
221ICJ Statute, Art.49. 
222 Michael Scharf & Margeaux Day, The International Court of Justice’s Treatment of 
Circumstantial Evidence, 13 CHICAGO J. INT’L LAW 123, 127 (2012). 
223 See Timor-Leste, Provisional Measures, Memorial of Australia, ¶75(c). 
224 Compromis, ¶33-34. 
 




without direct evidence.225 This Court in Corfu Channel distinguished 
“indirect evidence” from direct evidence, requiring that inferences of fact 
from indirect evidence “leave no room for reasonable doubt.”226 In 
Cameroon v. Nigeria¸ this Court rejected a claim when the indirect evidence 
did not provide a “clear and precise picture” of the facts.227 The more serious 
the charges, the higher the degree of proof of attribution required from 
circumstantial evidence.228 Applicant’s evidence of Rieslandic involvement 
in the cyberattacks rests entirely on circumstantial evidence, comprising an 
academic report and general facts about Riesland’s telecommunications 
infrastructure. 
 
B. The cyber-attacks cannot be linked to an organ of 
Riesland. 
Acts of an organ of a state are attributable to that state.229 Even if the 
AIT report is correct,230 cyber-activity originating from or transmitted 
through Riesland’s cyber infrastructure is not sufficient to prove 
attribution.231 Modern cyber-attackers are able to use proxy servers and 
virtual private networks to mask their true origin.232 Cyber-attackers can 
assume the identity of another by infiltrating and controlling computers 
through “zombie” networks.233 Once these computers are infected, a cyber-
attacker can control the zombies while masking the perpetrator’s true 
identity.234 Even without directly utilizing another’s hardware, sophisticated 
                                                          
225 Scharf & Day, 149; See Nicaragua, ¶¶109-16; Pulau Ligitan and Pulau Sipadon Islands, 2002 
I.C.J 666, ¶¶85, 90; Oil Platforms, ¶60; See also Brownlie, State Responsibility and the International 
Court of Justice, in ISSUES OF STATE RESPONSIBILITY BEFORE INTERNATIONAL JUDICIAL INSTITUTIONS 
13, 17 (Fitzmaurice & Sarooshi, eds. 2004).  
226 Corfu Channel, p.18. 
227 Cameroon/Nigeria, ¶¶232, 234; Rosalyn Higgins, Issues of State Responsibility before the 
International Court of Justice, in STATE RESPONSIBILITY 1, 9. 
228 Genocide Case, ¶¶209-210, 373; See Island of Palmas Case (US/Neth.), 2. R.I.A.A. 829, 852 
(P.C.A. 1928); MALCOLM SHAW, INTERNATIONAL LAW 567 (2014). 
229 Articles on the Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts [ARSIWA], (I.L.C. 
Yearbook 2001-I)Pt. II, Art.4(1); TALLINN MANUAL ON THE INTERNATIONAL LAW APPLICABLE TO 
CYBER WARFARE, Rule 6, ¶6 (M.Scmhitt, ed. 2013). 
230 Compromis 
231 See TALLINN MANUAL, Rule 7, 8. 
232 See Mauno Pihelgas, Back-Tracing in Cyberspace, in PEACETIME REGIME FOR STATE 
ACTIVITIES IN CYBERSPACE 42-46 (Katharina Ziolkowski, ed., 2013). 
233Pihelgas, 46-47. 
234 TALLINN MANUAL, Rule 6, ¶11; See also Evan Cooke, The Zombie Roundup: Understanding, 
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cyber-attackers can feign the identity of an individual or organization using 
proxy servers, virtual private networks, or by electronically falsifying 
data.235 Cyber-attackers in 1998 successfully misdirected the United States 
by creating the impression that an attack launched on the Department of 
Defense from California and Israel originated in countries from 5 different 
time zones.236 Given these various methods of obscuring an attacker’s 
identity in cyberspace, the circumstantial evidence in the Compromis237 is 
insufficient to prove attribution through a Rieslandic government organ. 
 
C. Riesland did not have effective control over the cyber-
attackers. 
a. Effective control is the appropriate standard. 
Attribution of an act taken by non-state actors to a state requires 
“instruction,” “direction,” or “control” over the acts.238 This Court interprets 
customary law to require that a State had “effective control” over the actors 
at the time of the allegedly wrongful act.239 NATO’s committee of experts 
convened to summarize customary cyber-law decided that, in the electronic 
realm, “the State needs to have issued specific instructions or directed or 
controlled a particular operation to engage State responsibility.”240 The 
“overall control” test for attribution, adopted by the majority in the Tadic 
case,241 is not the appropriate standard. Tadic addressed individual criminal 
responsibility under international humanitarian law rather than State 
responsibility under customary law of attribution.242 This Court distinguished 
Tadic in the Genocide judgment.243 
 
b. There is insufficient evidence of effective 
                                                          
Detecting, and Disrupting Botnets, SRUTI 05 Technical Paper, Univ. of Mich. (2005). 
235 TALLINN MANUAL, Rule 7, ¶4. See Christopher C. Joyner & Catherine Lotrionte, Information 
Warfare as International Coercion, 12 EUROPEAN J. INT’L L. 825, 839 (2001); Pihelgas, 42-49. 
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239 Nicaragua ¶¶109, 115; Nicaragua, Sep. Op. Judge Ago, ¶17. 
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Applicant can provide no evidence that Riesland provided instruction or 
direction to the perpetrators of the Amestonian attacks. In Nicaragua, this 
Court held that the indirect evidence of U.S. involvement in Contra activities 
was insufficient to prove attribution absent direct evidence,244 in spite of 
evidence that every Contra offensive had been preceded by an infusion of 
United States funding245 and reports of CIA training for paramilitary 
operatives.246 Evidence of origination in Riesland of an attack by unknown 
actors, with no direct evidence of support from Rieslandic officials, provides 
even less proof than the facts of Nicaragua. 
 
D. Riesland cannot be held liable merely because the 
cyber-attacks originated from its territory. 
No evidence exists that Riesland failed to exercise due diligence to 
prevent the cyber-attacks.247 To hold Riesland strictly liable without such 
evidence would flagrantly contravene customary law. Strict liability has been 
consistently rejected in the law of State responsibility outside of “ultra-
hazardous activities.”248 
 
E. In any event, the cyber-operations were not an 
internationally wrongful act. 
1. The cyber-operations were not an unlawful use 
of force. 
Cyber-attacks do not violate Article 2(4) unless their scale and effects 
are comparable to traditional uses of force,249 which generally requires 
physical damage.250 This flows from the Court’s focus on scale and effects to 
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determine whether force had been used in its Nicaragua judgment.251  
The scale of the attacks was too small to be classified as a use of force, 
only affecting computers at two Amestonian organizations.252 The disruption 
in Amestonia was far less severe than in Estonia in 2008, and the attack on 
Estonia was not condemned by the international community as a use of 
force.253  
The effects of the cyber-attacks on Amestonia were not comparable to 
traditional uses of force. The attacks exclusively targeted computer systems, 
and resulted merely in the elimination of data at private organizations and 
disruption of electronic infrastructure.254 The international community does 
not regard mere economic loss as a violation of Article 2(4).255 
 
2. If the cyber-operations were a use of force, they 
were justified under Riesland’s right to self-
defense. 
States have the right to use force in self-defense to repel an imminent 
armed attack,256 which can include an ongoing threat from a pattern of 
terrorist activity.257 Customary law supports the existence of such a right,258 
evidenced by the lack of condemnation, and even support, from the 
international community for uses of force against alleged terrorist groups,259 
and other non-state actors.260 The Armed Activities Court explicitly left open 
the question of whether the right exists.261 The right can also justify force 
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affecting States harboring non-state actors.262 Uses of force in self-defense 
must be both necessary to prevent further damage and proportional to harm 
averted.263 Riesland’s cyber-attacks were necessary to prevent the Hive’s use 
of confidential information, such as the kind of information that prevented 
the honey attack, which Amestonia refused to confiscate.264 The cyber-
attacks were proportionate to the threat of harm from large-scale terrorist 
attacks from the Hive following a pattern of activity.  
 
3. The cyber-operations were not an unlawful 
intervention. 
States violate the norm of non-intervention when they interfere in other 
States’ internal affairs using coercion.265 That interference must be of a level 
that “subordinates the sovereign will” of the target state over a matter that the 
victim state is rightfully entitled to decide.266 The vast majority of State 
action within another State’s territory does not violate this norm.267 The 
attacks on Amestonia temporarily disrupted the activities of a law firm and 
removed stolen information from a private newspaper.268 The scale of these 
effects is not sufficient to amount to coercion. 
 
4. Alternatively, the cyber-attacks were lawful 
countermeasures. 
States injured by internationally wrongful acts may resort to 
proportional269 cyber countermeasures.270 States must notify the violating 
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State of intent to pursue countermeasures,271 though this requirement is 
flexible when a state must act urgently to prevent injury.272  
 
a. Amestonia violated international law by 
allowing Riesland’s confidential data to be 
disseminated on its territory. 
The Security Council identified acts of international terrorism as threats 
to international peace and security,273 and declared that all states are obliged 
to prevent the use of their territory for planning or facilitating terrorist acts.274 
Furthermore, Amestonia violated the object and purpose of two anti-
terrorism treaties obliging Amestonia’s cooperation to prevent terrorist 
attacks.275  
Riesland called on Amestonia to cease allowing Amestonian entities to 
possess and publish Riesland’s stolen, confidential, documents, which 
contained information that the Hive could use to counter Riesland’s 
intelligence operations.276 Riesland notified Amestonia it would take 
measures to prevent the leaked documents from causing harm.277 
b. The countermeasures were proportional. 
Countermeasures must be “directed against”278 the violating state and 
“equivalent with the alleged breach,”279 and must be temporary and 
reversible.280  The attacks on Amestonia targeted exclusively the data that 
was the cause of Amestonia’s breach.281 The damage caused by the breach, 
which was entirely non-physical, was reversed in months. 
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PRAYER FOR RELIEF 
 
The Federal Republic of Riesland respectfully requests this Court to adjudge 
and declare: 
I. 
The illicitly-obtained documents published on the Ames Post are not 
admissible evidence, and, if the Court does find them admissible, they do not 
evidence a breach of international law; and 
 
II. 
The arrest of VoR employees and expropriation of VoR property 
violated the Broadcasting Treaty and international law generally, and 
therefore Riesland is entitled to the release of its nationals and compensation 
for its confiscated property; and 
 
III. 
Riesland’s detention of Joseph Kafker under the Terrorism Act is 
consistent with international law, and the Court has no authority to order his 
release or disclosure of information relating to his apprehension; and 
 
IV. 
The cyber attacks against the computer systems of Amestonian 
corporations cannot be attributed to Riesland, and in any event, were not an 
internationally wrongful act.  
Respectfully Submitted, 
Agents of the Government of the Federal Republic of Riesland 
